Abstract-This paper tests the relationship between business group characteristics and corporate cash holdings for business group-affiliated firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and in the Over-The-Counter market from 2000 to 2009. Specifically, this paper employs group affiliation, group diversification, group ownership holdings, and group listed numbers as business group characteristic variables. The empirical results reveal that group-affiliated firms hold more cash than non-affiliated firms. Besides, the results show that more highly-diversified groups, groups with more stock ownership holdings, and groups with fewer listed firms hold lower cash balances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Business groups play a prominent role in economic development in Taiwan. According to the investigative report on business groups in Taiwan provided by China Credit Information Service (CCIS), Ltd., the employment of the top 100 business groups accounted for about 11% of the Taiwanese employed population in 2009. Compared with their stand-alone counterparts, business group-affiliated firms are more likely to acquire financial capital from an efficient business environment because the business groups act as a social network that offers benefits to their affiliates and resolve the problems that arise from the imperfections in the emerging markets [1] . Nevertheless, Yeh and Woidtke [2] indicate that business groups in Taiwan are characterized by their relatively weak protection of minority shareholders. Kusnadi [3] shows that those managers in firms with a pyramidal group ownership structure are inclined to accumulate cash balances, and the presence of a pyramidal ownership structure in firms could lead to an entrenchment effect and therefore an increase in agency costs.
Previous studies on business groups have analyzed the relationship between business group affiliation and groupaffiliated firms' performance, innovation, and leverage policies [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . However, little attention has been directed to addressing business group characteristic effects on the cash holding decisions of group-affiliated firms. Corporate cash holdings play an important role in a firm's assets and operating activities. Firms' cash holdings have received much attention from corporate managers, investors, Manuscript received July 28, 2012; revised September 25, 2012 . Ching-Chieh Tsai is with the Department of Accounting Information, National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taichung, Taiwan (R.O.C.) (e-mail: tcc57@ nutc.edu.tw). and analysts and have had a massive impact on the way many companies operate around the world since the credit crunch that started in late 2007 [8] .
By using an integration of the agency theory with the institutional perspective and by performing regression analyses, this paper attempts to extend the research streams from the business group characteristics and to examine the relationship between business group effects and firm cash holdings for business group-affiliated firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and in the Over-The-Counter market. This paper employs the following factors as business group characteristic variables: group affiliation, group diversification, group ownership holdings, and group listed numbers.
The empirical findings reveal that group-affiliated firms with higher operating cash flows, net working capital, and growth opportunities, which are smaller in size, have lower leverage, pay out dividends, and are listed in the TSE, hold more cash than non-affiliated firms. The results reveal the entrenchment effects of group-affiliated firms' cash holdings. The empirical evidence is in line with the argument proposed by Kusnadi [3] which indicates that the business group pyramidal structure can create and facilitate internal capital markets for affiliated firms and allow the controlling shareholders to control large cash flows. The findings also suggest that the groups which gain nearly full control of the firms prefer to diversify, rather than keep their cash within the group-affiliated firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the paper reviews the related prior research and develops the hypotheses. In Section III, the paper outlines the research design and describes the sample and data. Finally, Section IV presents and discusses the primary results.
II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Business groups are an important business form in many emerging economies as well as developed markets. Academic studies have recognized several theoretical perspectives to explain the emergence of such groups. These include the resource dependence view, institutional perspective, and transaction cost analysis [6] , [9] - [13] . According to these perspectives, business groups act as a social network to offer benefits to their affiliates and resolve the problems that arise from the imperfection of the emerging markets. As compared to the stand-alone counterparts, group-affiliated firms are more likely to acquire capital from an efficient business environment. The prior literature on business groups has analyzed the relationship between business group affiliation and group-affiliated firms' policies [4] , [6] , [5] , [7] . Corporate cash holdings have received much attention from corporate managers, investors, and analysts and have had a important impact on the way many companies operate throughout the world since the credit crunch that started in late 2007 [8] . Therefore, this paper seeks to examine a previously ignored but important association between business group characteristic effects and the cash holdings of the group-affiliated firms. Based on Chava and Purnanandam [14] , which considers cash balances to be a negative form of leverage, this paper attempts to establish a positive linkage between business group affiliation and the cash holding decision. Thus, this paper constructs the first hypothesis as follows:
H1: The business group-affiliated firms hold more cash reserves than non-affiliated firms.
Khanna and Palepu [11] argue that the size of a business group influences firm performance. Young [15] uses the number of listed firms affiliated to a group as a proxy variable for the business group's size to examine the spillover effects of group diversification on R&D across different firms within the same business group. George and Kabir [16] also define business group size as the number of listed firms affiliated to a group and indicate that profit redistribution is more pronounced in groups that are large in size. Thus, this paper predicts that the number of listed firms affiliated to a group has a positive impact on affiliated firms' cash holdings and constructs the second hypothesis as follows:
H2: The number of listed firms affiliated to a group is positively related to the group-affiliated firms' cash holdings.
Diversification is one of the ways for a company to grow. Prior research regarding business group diversification has indicated that business group diversification has spillover effects and the affiliated firms within the group can share with each other the diverse synergized benefits derived from group-diversified operations [15] , [7] . Using Compustat firm-level and segment-level data, Subramaniam et al. [8] find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. They show that the lower level of cash holdings among diversified firms can be attributed to their access to internal capital markets and greater potential for asset sales. Based on these studies, this paper proposes that the group diversification is negatively associated with affiliated firms' cash holdings and establishes the third hypothesis as follows:
H3: The degree of business group diversification is negatively related to the group-affiliated firms' cash holdings.
Chang [17] demonstrated that the concentrated group inside ownership in Korean business groups could mitigate agency problems. Hsieh et al. [7] argue that the concentration on inside ownership strengthens the owner's power over the management team and also reflects the owner's incentive to account for long-term objectives. Bertrand et al. [18] find that the controlling shareholders will transfer or tunnel profits across group-affiliated firms. Following these studies, this paper predicts that the highly concentrated ownership could mitigate the managerial entrenchment agency costs and establishes the fourth hypothesis as follows:
H4: The business group ownership level is negatively related to the group-affiliated firms' cash holdings.
III. DATA AND METHODS

A. Sample Data
The sample firms employed in this study include firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and in the Over-The-Counter market (OTC) from 2000 to 2009. Data are collected from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. This paper drops the finance and insurance industries and government firms due to the unique nature of their regulations and requirements. After deleting firms with missing data, the final sample comprises a total of 9,449 firm-year observations of which 2,948 are related to affiliated firms and 6,501 to non-affiliated firms. The data for the 2,948 affiliated firm-year observations are used to construct group characteristic variables. To reduce the possible influence of outlier observations, all of the variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile levels.
B. Measures
Based on prior research, corporate cash holdings CAHO is measured as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets [19] . The following are the definitions of the independent variables. Business group affiliation DBGA is measured by an indicator variable, which takes a value of one, if the firm belongs to a business group with at least two listed firms, and zero otherwise. The group listed number LIST is the number of listed firms affiliated to a group. Young [15] indicates that the number of listed firms affiliated to a group could serve as a proxy for the group's size. Group diversification DIVE is defined as the number of industry lines represented in the business group with which the firm is affiliated [5] . Based on Hsieh et al. [7] and Chen and Yu [20] , this paper also measures group diversification with the widely-used entropy index and arrives at the same results. Finally, group ownership CONT is measured as the percentage of an affiliated firm's common stock shares held by the affiliated business group [21] .
A number of firm-specific control variables included in the regression models are all based on the existing research [3] , [19] , [21] - [27] . Specifically, this paper uses firm size, leverage, the market-to-book ratio, the ratio of net working capital, the operating cash flow ratio, the dividend dummy, and year dummies as control variables. The definitions of the control variables are explicitly defined as follows.
Firm size SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets. Firms that are large in size are expected to acquire financial capital in an easier and cheaper way [27] . Thus, this paper expects there to be a negative relationship between firm size and cash holdings. Firm leverage LEV is measured as total debt divided by total assets. It is widely accepted that leverage increases the probability of the firm experiencing financial distress and the managers are subjected to more monitoring and are allowed less discretionary power over the firm's policy. Chava and Purnanandam [14] indicate that the cash balance constitutes a negative form of leverage. Therefore, this paper expects there to be a negative relationship between firm leverage and cash holdings.
Market-to-book value MB is the book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by total assets. The market-to-book value is employed as a proxy for corporate growth opportunities. A valuable future investment opportunity creates a demand for holding a large stock of cash. A financially constrained company might forego profitable investment opportunities due to the shortage of internally generated financing. It follows that group-affiliated firms with a higher market-to-book ratio should have a higher cash reserves.
Net working capital WOC is current assets minus current liabilities divided by total assets. Net working capital is typically considered to be a substitute for cash and a proxy for liquidity for a firm [19] . Thus, this paper expects there to be a negative association between higher net working capital and cash holdings in group-affiliated firms. The operating cash flow ratio OCF is measured as operating income divided by total assets. It is expected that firms with higher cash flow would hold more cash [23] . The dividends payment DID is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm pays out cash dividends, and zero otherwise. When the external financial cost is low and firms can raise funds easily, the firms may try to decrease retained earnings by paying out dividends. Therefore, in line with prior studies, it is expected that firms that pay dividends hold less cash than those firms that do not pay dividends. Finally, this study employs nine year dummy variables to account for the macroeconomic unobserved variation. Table I provides the definitions of the related variables for the entire sample of 9,449 firms and 2,948 sample firms affiliated with business groups. Table II reports the summary descriptive statistics of the related variables used in the models over the whole sample period. The sample descriptive statistics of the related variables for the full sample firms are generally comparable to those for the affiliated and non-affiliated firms. Table II indicates that the average cash holdings ratio CASH for the full sample firms is about 16.8%, which is smaller than the corresponding ratios of affiliated firms. The results show that the affiliated firms hold more cash than their unaffiliated counterparts. The mean value of the total assets SIZE is 6.63. The mean and standard deviation of leverage LEV for the full sample firms are 43.1% and 71.6%, respectively. The mean value of leverage for the affiliated and non-affiliated firms is similar to that for full sample firms. The mean of the market-to-book ratio MB and net working capital ratio WOC for the non-affiliated firms are 1.318 and 0.12, respectively, which are higher than those for the affiliated firms. The results show that the non-affiliated firms have higher growth opportunities and cash substitutes than do their affiliated counterparts. The average operating cash flow ratio and dividend payment ratio DID for the full sample are 0.07 and 0.623, respectively. On average, 62% of the sample firms pay out dividends.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The mean value of the business group affiliation dummy variable DBG for the full sample firms is 0.312, which indicates that about 31.2% of the sample firms are affiliated with business groups and that those business groups have at least two listed firms. The mean values of the group listed number LIST and group diversification DIVE for the affiliated firms are 3.616 and 1.805, respectively. On average, the business groups have nearly four listed firms and two industry lines. Finally, the mean value of the group ownership CONT for the affiliated firms is 31.944%. The results of the Pearson correlation matrix of the related variables for corporate cash holding measure are provided in Table III . In Table III , almost all of the correlations are significant at least at the 5% level. The relationships suggest that all of the business group explanatory variables are important in explaining the corporate cash holding decision. To maintain brevity, this paper does not tabulate the results of the Pearson correlation matrix of the related variables for other business group characteristic measures. All the correlations are significant at least at the 5% level. The relationships suggest that all of the business group characteristic variables are important in explaining the corporate cash holding levels. While most of the independent variables are highly correlated with the others, the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the explanatory variables in the regressions amount to less than 2 and suggest that a severe multicollinearity problem does not exist.
To examine the relationship between business group characteristics and the corporate cash holdings, the group listed numbers LIST, group diversification DIVE, and group ownership holdings CONT variables are the group characteristic variables that are included in the regression Learning, Vol. 2, No. 5, October 2012 models. This paper first includes a business group affiliation dummy variable and control variables in the empirical model. Next, this paper divides the full sample into two groups of firms, namely, those affiliated and non-affiliated firms, and performs regressions to test the hypothesis. This paper then performs regressions for the affiliated firms to clearly identify the effects of business group characteristics on cash holdings. Finally, this paper divides the affiliated firms into two groups of firms based on the listed markets, namely, those firms that are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and in the Over-The-Counter market and performs regressions to test the market effects. All models also include year dummy variables to account for the unobserved variation and the results are not tabulated. The results of the effects of the business group affiliation on cash holdings are provided in Table IV . The group affiliation dummy variable DBG coefficient for the full sample firms is positive and significant at the 1% level (with coefficient = 0.011, t-value = 4.196) and supports the view that business group-affiliated firms hold higher cash balances. The results provide evidence in support of H1. In Table IV , the intercept coefficients for the affiliated firms and non-affiliated firms are all positive and significant at the 1% level. The intercept coefficient for the affiliated firms (with coefficient = 0.297, t-value = 12.005) is bigger than that for the non-affiliated firms (with coefficient = 0.252, t-value = 12.594), which confirms the view that business group-affiliated firms hold higher cash reserves than do the non-affiliated firms. The findings provide additional evidence in support of H1.
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As for the control variables, the results are consistent with the prior literature [14] , [19] , [25] . Collectively, these results suggest that affiliated firms with higher net working capital, operating cash flows, and growth opportunities, that are smaller in size, have lower leverage and, pay out dividends, hold more cash than non-affiliated firms. Table V demonstrates the results of the effects of the other business group characteristics on group-affiliated firms' cash holdings. In Table V , the group listed number of firms LIST coefficients in columns #1 and #4 are all positive (with coefficient = 0.001 and coefficient = 0.007, respectively), but not all are significant at the 1% level. The results indicate that for groups with more listed numbers of firms, the affiliated firms are more likely to acquire financial capital from an efficient business environment and to have more cash reserves. The findings in columns #1 and #4 provide support for H2. Finally, the group diversification DIVE and ownership holdings CONT coefficients in columns #2, #3, and #4 are all negative and significant at the 1% level. The significantly negative effects on cash holdings suggest that the groups which gain nearly full control of the firms prefer to diversify, rather than keep cash within the firms. Collectively, the findings show that the more highly diversified groups, the groups with larger stock ownership holdings, and the lower listed number groups, hold smaller cash balances. Overall, the results provide support for H3 and H4.
Table VI provides the robustness results of the firm listed market effects on group-affiliated firms' cash holdings. In Table VI , the intercept coefficients in columns #1 and #2 are both positive and significant at the 1% level. However, the intercept coefficient in column #1 is bigger than in column #2 (with coefficient = 0.316 and coefficient = 0.237, respectively). The results indicate that the business group-affiliated firms that are listed in the OTC market are less likely to acquire financial capital from an efficient business environment and will have larger cash balances. In columns #3 and #4, the intercept coefficients arrive at similar results (with coefficient = 0.407 and coefficient = 0.289, respectively) and confirm that the group-affiliated firms that are listed in the OTC market hold more cash than those listed on the TSE. In Table VI , the group listed number of firms LIST coefficient in column #4 for the firms listed on the TSE is positive and significant at the 1% level (with coefficient = 0.01, t-value = 8.663), while the coefficient in column #3 for the firms listed in the OTC market is positive but not significant (with coefficient = 0.001, t-value = 0.275). The evidence shows that for groups with more listed numbers of firms, the affiliated firms are more likely to acquire financial capital from the TSE market than the OTC market and to hold more cash reserves. In addition, the results in columns #3 and #4 show that the more highly diversified groups and the groups with larger stock ownership holdings listed on the TSE and in the OTC market both hold smaller cash balances. Overall, the results in Table VI provide additional support for  H2, H3 , and H4. 
